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NEW DEAL ISSUES AND THE AMERICAN 
ELECTORATE, 1952-1988 
John G. Geer 
As each presidential election passes into the history books, debate renews over the status 
of the New Deal Party System. This article addresses part of that debate by examining 
changes in the electorate's assessment of New Deal issues. Despite the vast literature on 
realignment, there have been few efforts to see whether issues associated with the New 
Deal still shape the political attitudes of the American electorate. Using the NES's open- 
ended like/dislike questions on parties and candidates from 1952 to 1988, I show that New 
Deal issues remain central to the partisan attitudes of the public. These findings show 
that the agenda of the New Deal remains an integral part of how the American public 
thinks about their candidates and parties. There, of course, has been much change over 
the last four decades, but these results suggest, in general, that at least parts of the New 
Deal Party System remain intact. 
It has been nearly sixty years since Franklin Roosevelt captured the U.S. 
presidency. In the years following his inauguration, FDR oversaw a great 
many changes in American politics. One of the more important changes 
during his reign was the emergence of the New Deal Party System. Out of 
the turmoil of the Great Depression and FDR's response to that calamity, 
the Democrats emerged as the majority party for the first time since the 
Civil War. The rise of the Democrats as the dominant force in national 
politics can be attributed, in part at least, to a set of issues that one might 
label "New Deal." By 1936, the Democrats were arguing, among other 
things, that the federal government should protect "the family and home," 
establish "opportunity for all the people," and aid "those overtaken by di- 
saster." The Republicans, in contrast, opposed such action, preferring in- 
stead to rely on "the character and virtue, self-reliance, industry and thrift 
of the people," not "on the wisdom and power of the government."' These 
different approaches to solving the problems of the Great Depression were 
instrumental in the birth of the nation's fifth party system.2 
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The purpose of this article is to assess whether the public still thinks 
about the issues associated with the New Deal and whether the Democrats 
continue to benefit from the electorate's assessment of them. While we 
know that there has been a restructuring of the coalitions of the parties (see 
Petrocik, 1981, 1987; Stanley, Bianco, and Niemi, 1986; Ladd and Hadley, 
1978), and that the Republicans have been dominating presidential elec- 
tions over the last twenty years, we do not know very much about whether 
New Deal issues still structure the political thinking of the electorate. 
Such information is crucial in determining the status of the New Deal 
Party System. While party systems can be viewed from a variety of angles,3 
all previous systems have been defined by some overriding issue that domi- 
nated the political debate, like slavery in the 1850s or free silver in the 
1890s. The New Deal Party System is no different. In this case, contro- 
versy arose over the proper role of government in the economic lives of the 
electorate. This broad controversy led the parties to struggle over a set of 
narrower issues that redefined the political landscape. Issues such as social 
security, price subsidies for farmers, protection of labor unions, and con- 
straints on business practices all became part of the New Deal agenda. 
Thus, one way to assess the status of the New Deal Party System is to 
determine whether these kinds of issues still shape how the public thinks 
about the parties and candidates. 
One might be tempted to claim that given the recent defeats of the 
Democratic nominees, there must be a significant shift in the role of New 
Deal issues. Otherwise, how could the Democrats have lost five of the last 
six presidential elections? Although such a conclusion may prove accurate, 
it is also hasty. The outcome of any election can turn on many issues and 
not always those connected with a particular party system. In fact, the 
minority party has great incentive to stress issues tangential to the party 
system. As Carmines and Stimson observe, the minority party's goal is "to 
upset the dominant party alignment, including the issue basis on which it 
has been constructed" (1989, p. 6). So in 1988 Bush ran a campaign that 
talked about flag factories and Willie Horton, not health care and social 
security. The issues Bush stressed, of course, have little connection to the 
New Deal, but they were probably instrumental in helping Bush secure 
the presidency. Consequently, New Deal issues could remain important to 
the public and the Democratic party could maintain a lead on these con- 
cerns, despite the outcome of recent presidential elections. 
Using data from the National Election Studies (NES), I find that the 
issues comprising the heart and soul of the New Deal remain important to 
the partisan calculations of the American public and that the Democrats 
remain ahead of the Republicans on these matters, even during the so- 
called Reagan era. There has been important change in the role of New 
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Deal issues since the 1950s, but the durability of these concerns is impres- 
sive. These findings do not necessarily mean that the New Deal Party Sys- 
tem is alive and well. Clearly, the shifts in the coalitions of the parties and 
the recent inability of the Democrats to capture the White House indicate 
that important partisan change has unfolded over the last four decades. But 
the fact that New Deal issues continue to structure the partisan debate 
suggests, at minimum, that significant parts of the political agenda set in 
motion in the 1930s remain intact. 
To accept these various conclusions, however, one must find my defini- 
tion of New Deal issues reasonable, believe that the NES's open-ended 
questions about the parties and the candidates accurately reflect the parti- 
san concerns of the electorate, and believe that the method of analyzing 
these data is valid. 
NEW DEAL ISSUES 
My argument hinges, in large part, on a particular conception of what 
issues can be thought of as "New Deal." Disagreement over this definition 
will arise, since there are many ways to view New Deal issues. One might, 
for instance, argue that the debate over using the federal government to 
solve the economic ills of the nation is the issue that best symbolizes the 
New Deal. That view, of course, has merit. But the actual partisan disputes 
stemming from the New Deal often dealt with much more specific issues 
than just government intervention. Matters like agricultural policy, bank- 
ing, and social security were all part of the vast array of concerns emerging 
from that turbulent era. Consequently, I shall treat New Deal issues in a 
way that emphasizes these narrower concerns. 
The immediate question, of course, becomes: What issues constitute the 
New Deal? In a recent article, Stanley Kelley offers a useful definition that 
emphasizes these narrower concerns: 
In the New Deal era, controversy swirled about a particular set of conditions, 
policies, interests, and ideological themes. As one would expect in a party system born in the Great Depression, economic conditions-employment, wage levels, 
the cost of living, the goodness or badness of the times-were in the foreground 
of political debate. So were certain areas of policy, among them monetary and fiscal policy, agricultural and labor policy, social security and other welfare pro- 
grams, housing, power, education and health care. The era saw a politicizing of 
the interests of labor unions, farmers, the aged, the poor, and its rhetoric pitted 
the interests of "the common man," or working people, against those of big busi- 
ness, industry, and Wall Street. Ideological discourse put left and right, liberal- ism and conservatism, and radicalism and reaction in opposition to each other 
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and made tests of right thinking out of orientations toward big government, 
states' rights, planning, governmental action to improve social conditions, and 
control (or interference with) private enterprise. (1988, p. 190) 
These topics, ranging from labor policy to worries about big business, will 
be treated as New Deal issues. 
While this definition has appeal, a number of criticisms may arise. To 
start, one may question whether this particular set of issues accurately re- 
flects the New Deal. There is no way to satisfy everyone's view on this 
matter, but this definition should at least be seen as reasonable. For in- 
stance, if one examines the 1936 Democratic and Republican platforms, 
one will find that every topic I define as a New Deal issue was mentioned 
in some fashion in those documents. These two platforms provide some 
clue about the value of this definition, since they were the first official 
response by the national parties to the multitude of legislation that 
emerged between 1933 and 1935. 
A second possible objection is that this definition includes "too many" 
issues. A quick count of the issues mentioned yields over thirty different 
concerns. While many issues do fall under this wide umbrella, it is not 
clear that there are "too many." If one considers the numerous topics in a 
presidential campaign, New Deal issues, as defined here, comprise just a 
subset of these topics. For instance, matters surrounding the international 
arena are absent from this definition. Racial problems, crime, drugs, urban 
decay, and abortion also fall outside its purview. In political campaigns the 
candidates' personalities play a big role, yet these matters are not treated 
as New Deal issues.4 
Another related criticism of this definition might be that some of the 
issues included should not be considered "New Deal." One might, for in- 
stance, argue that concerns about fiscal policy, unemployment, or inflation 
were probably important to citizens before the New Deal and thus are 
independent of it. This argument has merit if one thinks that New Deal 
issues should be unique to that era. But there is little reason to adopt such 
a position. Consider, for instance, that the alignment of the 1890s was built 
in large part on the economic issues surrounding the dispute over free 
silver and the recession of 1893. The alignment of the 1930s was also built 
in part around economic issues, but those concerns stemmed from efforts 
to overcome the Great Depression. In all likelihood, then, matters pertain- 
ing to fiscal policy or unemployment would be part of each alignment, 
making it reasonable to include such concerns in one's conception of both 
"New Deal" and "free silver" issues. Sundquist offers support for this posi- 
tion, arguing that in "every new alignment of the party system . . . there 
will be large, perhaps dominant, elements carried over from the old" (1983, 
p. 17). 
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THE EVIDENCE 
To chart changes in the public's assessment of New Deal issues, I shall 
rely on the NES's open-ended questions that ask respondents to state in 
their own words what they like and dislike about the two parties and the 
two presidential nominees.5 The NES provides up to five answers per re- 
spondent for each of these eight questions, allowing potentially for forty 
comments.6 Individuals rarely make forty comments. But they do average 
about eight comments each, providing a rich source of information. 
These questions were first asked in 1952 and have been worded the same 
since then, creating an excellent opportunity to trace changes in the pub- 
lic's attitudes over a thirty-six-year time frame. This long-time series is 
particularly useful when assessing the importance and influence of the New 
Deal issues. While scholars disagree over the current status of the New 
Deal Party System, most believe it was in force during the 1950s and early 
1960s. Thus, the results from the presidential elections of 1952, 1956, and 
1960 provide a good benchmark from which to judge the public's response 
to New Deal concerns in the 1970s and 1980s.7 
Another asset of the like-dislike questions is that they are open-ended. 
This format allows respondents to describe parties and candidates in their 
own words, increasing the likelihood that these individuals mention con- 
cerns that are important to them (RePass, 1971; Kelley, 1983).' This aspect 
of the data is critical, since an issue must be salient to citizens before it can 
realign their partisan attitudes (Sundquist, 1983; Carmines and Stimson, 
1984). 
METHOD 
At this point, we have the data and a definition of what issues qualify as 
"New Deal." The next task is to devise a way to detect changes in the 
importance and partisan influence of these issues over the last forty years. 
There are a number of possible approaches. For this paper, I shall build 
upon Kelley's (1983) scheme of"interpreting elections." The modifications I 
introduce seek to adapt that approach to the study of partisan change. 
To assess the importance of New Deal issues, I shall rely on two different 
measures. The first measure Kelley (1983) and others have referred to as 
salience: the proportion of the electorate that mentions at least one New 
Deal issue among their responses to the open-ended questions about the 
parties and candidates. That information is quite useful, since we can see 
whether the proportion of the electorate that finds New Deal issues rele- 
vant has increased or decreased over time. In an effort to provide an addi- 
tional indicator of the importance of New Deal issues, I have developed a 
new measure, density: the proportion of all comments that are New Deal 
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in nature. This statistic is helpful, since it reports the share of the total 
partisan debate that can be labeled as New Deal. Thus, if there has been a 
shift away from the New Deal, density should decrease. Note that since the 
unit of analysis is the response, this measure provides no information about 
how many individuals made New Deal comments. 
These two measures in tandem should provide a satisfactory basis for 
estimating the importance of New Deal issues to the public. We also need 
to focus on which party the public views more favorably on these matters. 
It is possible that New Deal issues could still be salient to the public, but 
they could now draw citizens into the Republican camp. To test for this 
possibility, I have attached partisan signs to respondents' New Deal com- 
ments. A pro-Democratic New Deal comment is either a statement telling 
what individuals like about the Democrats or dislike about the Republi- 
cans. The reverse is true for pro-Republican comments. Like Kelley (1983), 
I then weighed each comment equally and simply subtracted the Republi- 
can total from the Democratic total.9 Therefore, the measure of New Deal 
issues for respondents ranges from +20, a highly Democratic score, to 
-20, a highly Republican score. In practice, however, the values rarely 
exceed + 10 or - 10. 
With this estimate of respondents' feelings on New Deal issues, one can 
then measure whether citizens favor the Democrats or Republicans on 
these matters. Here I shall rely on Kelley's (1983) notion of bias-that is, 
the proportion of respondents who see that issue as favoring one party or 
candidate. "' 
This measure, however, only tells part of the story. If, for instance, an 
issue heavily favors one party (i.e., a large bias) yet is salient to only a 
handful of people, that issue will lack the power to forge significant partisan 
change among the entire electorate. Similarly, a highly salient issue that 
favors neither party (i.e., a bias of 50%) would also be unable to alter the 
net partisan evaluation of the electorate. To generate significant partisan 
change (e.g., the New Deal Party System), therefore, an issue must be 
highly salient (e.g., the Great Depression) and must heavily favor one party 
(e.g., the Democrats). What we need, in other words, is to combine sa- 
lience with bias. 
To do so, I want to introduce the concept of net pull: the relative ability 
of the two parties to attract supporters on a given issue." The central idea 
here is that as an issue pulls some citizens to one party, it pushes others to 
the opposing side. So, for instance, while FDR's New Deal apparently 
brought many people into the Democratic fold, his stand on governmental 
activism surely drove others into the Republican camp. Thus, we need to 
assess the ability of each party to attract supporters on the basis of an issue 
and then compare those totals to get an estimate of the overall gain (or loss) 
for one party or the other. The formula I propose is as follows: 
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net pull = salience of an issue x (Democratic bias on that issue - 
Republican bias on that issue) 
One way to think of net pull is the lead a particular party holds over the 
other on a specific issue (or set of related issues). If that lead shrinks or 
grows, the result provides a useful estimate of partisan change. 
There is one final methodological task. Since we are interested in tracing 
partisan change over time, we need a way to summarize any trends that 
appear in the data. In an attempt to provide a systematic reading of these 
partisan shifts, I shall regress the election year on each of these propor- 
tions. I am not suggesting that time has caused the changes in these num- 
bers; rather, I am providing a way to measure change over time. Without 
estimating the slopes and the standard errors, one must just "eyeball" the 
data. Norpoth and Rusk adopt a similar approach, arguing that it captures 
"more accurately the extent of change over time" (1982, p. 528). 
THE RESULTS 
Table 1 reports the change in importance of New Deal issues using the 
NES's open-ended questions on the parties and the candidates. If one looks 
only at the results for the "likes and dislikes" about the parties, it appears 
that the importance of New Deal issues is waning. In 1952, for instance, 
nearly 80 percent of respondents cited at least one New Deal issue in their 
assessment of the parties. Just four years later, the proportion declined to 
66-the largest drop of any four-year period. By the early 1980s, the pro- 
portion of the electorate that viewed New Deal issues as salient slipped to 
just slightly over 50 percent. On average, salience has declined about 2 
percentage points per election. Density, on the other hand, has been quite 
stable over time, indicating that among all comments New Deal concerns 
play as big a role in the 1980s as they did in the 1950s. But the fact that 
there are fewer individuals making New deal comments in the 1980s, as 
indicated by salience, represents a significant decline in the importance of 
these issues.12 
The answers to the open-ended questions concerning parties suggest that 
a shift away from the agenda of the New Deal may be underway (or has 
taken place). When assessing the importance of New Deal issues, however, 
it is also important to look at the extent to which these concerns are associ- 
ated with the nominees of the parties. As Wattenberg (1990) has carefully 
demonstrated, the public over the last thirty-six years has come to tie is- 
sues more closely to candidates than to parties. Thus, by using data gener- 
ated by comparable questions on presidential candidates, one should be 
able to assess more fully the importance of New Deal issues to the Ameri- 
can public. 
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TABLE 1. Importance of New Deal Issues for the Electorate, 1952-1988 
Likes/Dislikes Likes/Dislikes Likes/Dislikes 
for Parties for Candidates for Both 
Salience Density Salience Density Salience Density N 
1952 79 55 21 7 80 32 1799 
1956 66 47 27 9 71 26 1762 
1960 64 51 34 8 69 26 1932 
1964 61 50 43 16 72 29 1571 
1968 61 41 32 10 68 24 1557 
1972 53 46 49 20 68 31 1372 
1976 55 50 41 15 68 29 2870 
1980 51 50 49 18 70 29 1570 
1984 53 48 68 33 78 39 2257 
1988 60 51 44 22 69 35 2040 
Mean 60 49 41 16 71 30 
Slope" -2.1' -.2 3.5) 2.2'b -.4 .9 
S.E. .6 .4 .9 .5 .5 .4 
Source: National Election Studies. 
"The year of the survey was coded 1952 = 1, 1956 = 2, 1960 = 3, etc. The slope, there- 
fore, indicates the average change for each presidential election. 
Note that slopes and standard errors for this table and all subsequent ones are rounded off 
to the first decimal place. Also, since the time series involves just ten elections, the slopes 
have to be larger than just twice the size of the standard error to make the .05 cutoff. 
Note that to calculate the means and the regression estimates I used proportions rounded 
off to one decimal place. In the table, however, I have rounded up to whole numbers for the 
actual cell entries. This procedure is followed for all tables. 
"Statistically significant at the .01 level. 
The data from the public's evaluation of candidates tell a far different 
story from that of the electorate's assessment of parties: Namely, the im- 
portance of New Deal issues has increased since the 1950s. With regard to 
New Deal comments about candidates, both salience and density have 
risen over the thirty-six-year period. In 1956, about 27 percent of the elec- 
torate found New Deal matters salient when assessing the nominees. By 
1984, the proportion soared to 68 percent. The surge in 1984 was unusual, 
but compared to the rest of the 1980s, or even the 1970s, candidates are 
still being judged more for their stands on New Deal issues than they were 
in the 1950s. The slope for salience confirms this observation, showing 
that, on average, there has been a 3 to 4 percent increase per election since 
1952. In the case of density, the rise has been about threefold since the 
1950s. 13 
This finding is important and interesting, since it is at odds with most of 
the previous work in this area. It would be problematic to argue, however, 
52 GEER 
that these data about the candidates suggest that the New Deal is stronger 
in the 1980s than in the 1950s, especially given the results from the first 
two columns in Table 1 (not to mention the evidence presented by other 
political scientists). Nonetheless, the obvious question becomes which set 
of findings should one emphasize? Fortunately, the issue is not whether 
one set is "better" than the other in assessing partisan change. In point of 
fact, the best course is to combine both sets of questions into a single 
estimate of citizens' "partisan" calculations. 
This choice stems, in part, from an underlying conception on a party 
system. It seems reasonable to believe that party systems structure not 
only how citizens evaluate parties but how they judge the candidates of 
those parties. If true, then candidates in the 1890s, for instance, would 
have been judged, in part, on the basis of their views on free silver. Sim- 
ilarly, the issue of slavery would have been an integral part of the elector- 
ate's assessment of presidential candidates in the 1850s. While we cannot 
be sure, such scenarios seem likely. In more recent times, the issue of 
social security illustrates quite well this point. To some degree, support of 
this program, a cornerstone of the New Deal, has served as a litmus test for 
presidential candidates since the 1930s. Nominees of the major parties 
have needed to show support for it or face electoral trouble, as Barry Gold- 
water might attest. Even Ronald Reagan, a frequent critic of social security 
in the 1970s, changed his stance on this issue for the 1980 campaign. He 
knew that if he did not support this safety net for the less fortunate, there 
could be serious electoral consequences (Drew, 1981, pp. 298, 308). Such 
behavior underscores the connection between the candidates and the cen- 
tral issues of the party system. Thus, while looking at the comments about 
the parties and candidates separately is instructive, it is also important to 
examine the combined role of New Deal comments when assessing the 
"partisan" evaluations of citizens. 
A second and related reason for this choice is that even though each 
question asks explicitly about parties or candidates, there may be some 
conceptual slippage. That is, one cannot treat the nominees as completely 
distinct from the parties. Ronald Reagan, for instance, is now tied closely to 
how people think of the GOP (Grand Old Party). In the 1930s, FDR's 
flamboyant style surely became part of citizens' assessments of the Demo- 
crats. The recent efforts by the GOP to label the Democrats as the party of 
Jimmy Carter lends further support to this point. In short, candidates often 
help define the parties, just as the parties help define the candidates.14 
The last two columns in Table 1 present the results when one combines 
the both sets of questions into a single indicator. As one can see, New Deal 
issues have remained remarkably stable in their importance to the public 
during the four decades studied. There was a noticeable drop in the sa- 
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lience of New Deal issues after 1952. But since then, the salience of New 
Deal issues has hovered right around 70 percent. The 1984 election saw a 
small jump to 78 percent, but by 1988 salience returned to 69 percent- 
just about average. Density has also varied a bit from one campaign to 
another. But for both measures, the small and statistically insignificant re- 
gression slopes confirm the general sense of stability. Based on the data 
since 1956, there is little evidence of a decline in the importance of New 
Deal issues to the public.15 
While the findings above show that the public continues to think about 
New Deal issues, these data do not reveal whether there has been any 
change in the electorate's assessment of parties on these matters. Carmines 
and Stimson (1981, 1984, 1989), for instance, have forcefully argued that 
although there may not have been a shift in party systems, there still has 
been important partisan change affecting the balance of the two parties. 
Consequently, it is important to examine what, if any, inroads the GOP has 
made into the Democrats' standing on New Deal issues. 
The findings indicate that the Republicans have made inroads in the 
public's partisan evaluation of New Deal issues. As Table 2 reports, the 
GOP has enjoyed clear gains in the public's comments about the parties. 
The Democrats have managed to maintain a favorable bias during the en- 
tire period, but, on average, it has slipped by about one percentage point 
per election. The electorate's perception of candidates on New Deal issues 
tells a slightly different story, depending on one's point of comparison. The 
Democratic bias in 1984 and 1988, for instance, was much the same as it 
was in 1952 and 1956. But if one, instead, compares the last two presiden- 
tial elections to that of 1964, then there have been significant gains by the 
GOP. In 1964, LBJ netted the highest bias of any of the ten elections (71 
percent), which was nearly 15 percentage points higher than Dukakis's rat- 
ing. It is unclear which comparison is more useful. But it is hard to escape 
the fact that the Republicans have been able to forge a more positive bias 
in recent years. 
The net pull provides the best summary of the impact of New Deal is- 
sues on the electorate's political views, since it combines salience and bias. 
The results, like those above, indicate that the Democrats remain the ma- 
jority party on these issues, albeit a shrinking majority. From 1952 to 1964, 
the average net pull for the public assessment of parties and candidates was 
about 25.16 From 1968 to 1988, the Democratic advantage shrunk to just 
over 11. Consider, for instance, that against Carter in 1980, Reagan en- 
joyed as large an advantage as Johnson did over Goldwater, not due to 
issues such as defense and morality but die to the bread and butter issues 
of the New Deal. As a result, in 1980 the overall net pull favored the 
Republicans for the first time. The edge was slight, but compared to the 
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TABLE 2. The Electorate's Assessment of Parties and Candidates on New Deal 
Issues, 1952-1988 
Likes/Dislikes Likes/Dislikes Likes/Dislikes 
for Parties for Candidates for Both 
Democratic Net" Democratic Net Democratic Net 
Bias Pull Bias Pull Bias Pull 
1952 66 26 56 2 64 23 
1956 74 31 57 4 69 28 
1960 67 21 63 9 65 21 
1964 67 21 71 18 69 27 
1968 60 12 55 3 58 10 
1972 69 20 49 -1 60 14 
1976 68 19 66 13 67 23 
1980 62 13 32 - 18 48 -3 
1984 60 11 .54 5 57 11 
1988 61 13 57 6 60 13 
Mean 65 19 56 4 62 17 
Slope - 1.0' - 1.8 -1.1 -.7 -1.4 -2.0' 
S.E. .4 .4 1.2 1.1 .6 .9 
Source: National Election Studies. 
Note: See the text for the creation of bias and net pull. 
"I computed net pull using measures of salience and bias rounded off to the first decimal 
place. 
"Statistically significant at the .01 level. 
'Statistically significant at the .05 level. 
1950s, it was quite a reversal. This GOP advantage was short-lived, how- 
ever, as the Democrats bounced back in 1984 and 1988 with sizable leads 
on New Deal issues.17 
The information in Tables 1 and 2 offers a host of interesting findings. To 
begin, the Democrats, despite recent gains by the Republicans, remain the 
favored party. Of course, one could argue that the trend favoring the GOP 
suggests that we are in the middle of a shift that will lead them to majority 
status. While possible, it is simply too early to tell. Perhaps an even more 
interesting finding is the differential trend in salience among the questions 
for parties and candidates. This result, at minimum, suggests that previous 
work that has focused solely on the public's assessments of the parties when 
assessing partisan change have missed an important piece of the puzzle. 
And this piece of the puzzle, when included in the analysis, shows that 
New Deal issues remain central to the public's partisan calculations-evi- 
dence that the nation's fifth party is not dead yet. 
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A CLOSER LOOK AT NEW DEAL ISSUES 
The accuracy of the conclusions presented so far hinge, in large part, on 
my definition of New Deal issues. While this definition is reasonable, one 
could worry that its breadth may cover up important patterns of change in 
the public's attitudes. These underlying patterns might actually lend sup- 
port to the notion of a shift in the partisan agenda. For instance, the elector- 
ate may be far less supportive of the Democrats' commitment to an activist 
federal government in the 1980s. Or perhaps the public no longer thinks of 
the Democrats as the party of the working class. Such changes would indi- 
cate a restructuring of public attitudes, but my definition of New Deal 
issues may be obscuring it. 
To test for this concern, I have developed four subcategories of New 
Deal issues: short-term economic conditions, government programs and 
policies, group-related attitudes, and ideological references (see Appendix 
A for the exact coding scheme). These four categories should help sort out 
the possibility of differential change in the public's thinking about New 
Deal issues. By examining short-term economic issues, for instance, one 
can measure change in the public's partisan response to such matters as 
inflation, unemployment, and taxes. References to "government programs 
and policies," on the other hand, tap the public's response to classic New 
Deal policies like social security, welfare, job programs, and health care. 
Group-related concerns measure whether the public still views the Demo- 
crats as the party of the poor, the aged, the unemployed, the farmers, and 
the working class. Finally, ideological concerns will detect any shift in the 
public's attitudes toward such things as liberals, conservatives, states' 
rights, and government activism. These four groups, in sum, should pro- 
vide additional insight into the patches of this New Deal quilt. 
Table 3 reports the importance of these issues to the public when de- 
scribing what they like and dislike about the parties and candidates.'8 
Whether one looks at salience or density, these four sets of issues have 
remained important to the public over the thirty-six-year time frame. The 
only statistically significant change over time arises for references about 
New Deal programs and policies. And in this particular case, the impor- 
tance of these issues has actually increased. The salience in 1984 and 1988, 
for instance, has more than doubled since 1952. Thus, one of the core 
components of the New Deal has actually become more salient to the pub- 
lic in recent years-hardly evidence consistent with the argument that 
there has been a drift away from the political concerns of the New Deal. 
The next question concerns possible changes in the partisan bias of these 
issues. Table 4 tackles this matter, offering mixed support for claims of a 
shift toward the Republicans. For instance, short-term economic concerns 
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TABLE 3. Importance of New Deal Issues for the Electorate, 1952-1988" 
Governmient 
Short-Term Progralms Group- 
Economic and Related Ideological 
Issues Policies Attitudes Concerns 
SN DN SN DN SN DN SN DN 
1952 60 13 16 2 44 9 23 4 
1956 33 6 18 3 47 12 15 3 
1960 36 7 18 3 40 10 21 5 
1964 27 5 30 6 43 9 32 7 
1968 30 5 22 4 38 8 27 5 
1972 35 9 24 5 42 12 18 4 
1976 43 10 16 3 43 10 18 3 
1980 44 10 20 4 :37 9 18 4 
1984 53 13 34 7 42 12 23 4 
1988 40 9 34 8 41 10 24 5 
Mean 40 8 23 5 42 10 22 4 
Slope .3 .3 1.5' .4' -.4 .1 -.05 -.03 
S.E. 1.2 .3 .6 .2 .3 .1 .6 .1 
"Key: SN = salience; 1)N = densitv. 
'Statistically significant at the .05 level. 
now favor the GOP. In each of the last three presidential elections the 
Republicans have had a favorable net pull, ranging from about 22 percent 
in 1980 to about 8 percent in 1988. This change surely reflects a combina- 
tion of Carter's economic problems in the late 1970s and Reagan's successes 
in the 1980s. The GOP has also made slight gains on the "ideological" front, 
but the increase in net pull has been less than one percentage point per 
election. 
The other two sets of New Deal issues, in contrast, indicate continuity 
rather than change. For instance, during this entire period the Democrats 
have built huge leads in group-related concerns, suggesting that the party 
and its nominees continue to be favorably connected to the poor, the aged, 
the farmers, and the working class. This image of the Democratic party and 
candidates appears quite durable, since it weathered such events as Viet- 
nam, the economic recessions of the 1970s, and the Reagan era. References 
to New Deal programs and policies also continue to favor the Democrats. 
The pattern here, however, is a bit more twisted. That is, in 1984 and 1988 
the net pulls for these concerns were higher than reported in 1952 and 
1956. But between 1968 and 1980, there was weakening of the Democratic 
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TABLE 4. The Electorate's Assessment of Parties and Candidates on New Deal 
Issues, 1952-1988" 
Government 
Short-Term Programs Group- 
Economic and Related Ideological 
Issues Policies Attitudes Concerns 
DB NP DB NP DB NP DB NP 
1952 53 4 83 11 85 31 48 -1 
1956 56 4 75 9 86 34 54 1 
1960 52 1 65 5 85 28 41 -4 
1964 58 4 81 19 87 32 43 -4 
1968 34 - 10 64 5 81 24 38 -6 
1972 55 4 36 -7 84 28 22 -10 
1976 57 6 .54 2 88 33 32 -6 
1980 25 -22 47 -1 76 20 34 -6 
1984 38 -12 67 12 87 31 34 -7 
1988 40 -8 67 11 88 31 33 -8 
Mean 47 -3 64 7 85 29 38 -5 
Slope -2.2 - 1.9 -2.4 -.4 -.02 -.3 -2.2" -.9' 
S.E. 1.1 .9 1.5 .9 .4 .5 .7 .3 
"Key: DB = democratic bias; NP = niet pull. 
'Statistically significant at the .05 level. 
bias for these concerns. If one were writing in 1982, for instance, it might 
have been tempting to view the change as a withering of the New Deal. 
But additional data from 1984 and 1988 undercut such an argument. 
In short, two core components of the New Deal-government programs 
and policies and group-related concerns-remain salient to the public and 
continue to favor the Democrats. Even with the popularity of Reagan in 
1984 and 1988, the Democrats maintained an edge on these matters. The 
single biggest change over the last forty years has come on the economic 
front, where the public now gives the nod to the GOP. Whether this 
change signals the demise of the New Deal Party System is far from clear. 
Of all four issues, this one is probably the most fragile. That is, if the 
economic recession extends into the 1992 election, it could easily undo 
some of the recent gains by the GOP. Nonetheless, the data suggest that 
the public now thinks of the Republicans as the party of prosperity-a 
major change from the days when the GOP was thought of as the party of 
depression. 
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CONCLUSION 
What do these results suggest about the status of the New Deal Party 
System? Opinions in the literature range from the belief that the New Deal 
remains in force to that it has been replaced by a system that favors the 
GOP (see, for instance, Sundquist, 1983; Cavanagh and Sundquist, 1985; 
Miller, 1987; Shanks and Miller, 1991; Petrocik, 1981, 1987, 1989; Nor- 
poth, 1987; Norpoth and Kagay, 1989; Beck, 1979, 1984). The findings in 
this paper offer, in general, more support for the former than the latter 
view, since New Deal issues remain about as salient to the public in the 
1980s as in the 1950s and the Democrats continue to hold a lead over the 
Republicans on these concerns. 
But within these two general conclusions, there are other important 
points to make about partisan change. To begin, the Democrats' lead over 
the Republicans on New Deal issues has been shrinking. It is far from clear 
whether this pattern is signaling the final decline of the Democrats. But 
the results are consistent with claims that the GOP is moving toward ma- 
jority status. Part of the problem here is that the trend has not been mo- 
notonic. There was, for instance, a steep decline in the Democratic's edge 
in net pull on New Deal issues from 1964 to 1968 and 1976 to 1980. But in 
each case the Democrats did rebound in the following presidential elec- 
tion. So even if the GOP makes some important inroads in 1992, as some 
may think given Bush's current popularity, there is no reason to believe 
that the Democrats could not bounce back by 1996. 
Another point concerns the opposite trend in the salience of New Deal 
issues to the public. Recall that there has been a decline in the importance 
of New Deal issues for assessments of parties, but an increase in their 
importance for candidates. This pattern offers a number of interesting in- 
terpretations, some of which were addressed earlier. But one additional 
implication of potential significance is that these results indicate that a re- 
structuring of the electorate's political thinking could be just around the 
corner. Since candidates are increasingly being judged by New Deal stand- 
ards, the rhetoric of the nominees will probably have a big effect in deter- 
mining the overall importance of these issues to the public. Candidates, 
therefore, may now be able to set the tone of the political debate for the 
electorate. If so, future presidential nominees could introduce a new set of 
issues, thereby recasting the political agenda of the American electorate. 
Of course, nominees like Mondale may appear in the future, breathing life 
into New Deal issues. But the point is that the relevance of New Deal 
issues to the public probably rests on a more fragile foundation than at any 
time since the 1950s, which could be a harbinger of significant change. 
Although it is great fun to speculate about the future, the purpose of this 
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paper has been to assess the public's discussion of New Deal issues over 
the last ten presidential elections. Given that objective, one conclusion is 
clear: The issues forged in the 1930s continue to be important to the electo- 
rate even fifty-five years after FDR launched the New Deal. There has 
been important change during the thirty-six years under study, but the 
durability of New Deal issues is remarkable. Moreover, the longevity of 
the Democratic edge on these matters is also surprising. Public opinion, in 
short, appears quite stubborn. Perhaps the Republicans will be able to 
build on their successes in the 1980s, allowing them to usher in a new set 
of issues that restructures the political debate. But, at this point, it appears 
that the New Deal will continue to be an integral part of the public's think- 
ing well into the 1990s, suggesting that claims of a "realignment" are proba- 
bly overstated and that at least parts of the nation's fifth party system re- 
mains intact. 
APPENDIX A: CODING OF THE OPEN-ENDED COMMENTS 
Below I list the actual codes that were treated as "New Deal" for the like/dislike 
questions on parties and candidates. I shall, however, present only the scheme for 
the 1984 survey. This year is representative of the other studies, providing the 
reader with a sense of the exact codes used. The other years are available upon 
request. One can also see Kelley (1983) for a very similar coding scheme for New 
Deal issues. 
The "New Deal" codes for the like-dislike questions are: 7, 162-165, 531-536, 
605, 606, 805-828, 833, 834, 837, 838, 910-916, 920-945, 952-961, 1001-1003, 
1007-1009, 1025-1027, 1201, 1202, 1205-1210, 1215, 1216, 1219-1222, 1233, 
1234. 
Below are the codes for the four subcategories of the New Deal issues: 
Short-term economic concerns: 605, 606, 901, 926-941. 
Government programs and policies: 905-916, 920-925, 942-945, 952, 959, 960, 
961, 1001-1003, 107-1009, 1025-1027. 
Group-related attitudes: 953-958, 1201, 1202, 1205-1210, 1215, 1216, 1219- 
1222, 1233, 1234. 
Ideological concerns: 162-165, 531-536, 805, 812, 816, 818-828. 
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NOTES 
1. These passages are taken from the 1936 Democratic and Republican platforms (see John- 
son and Porter, 1973, pp. 360, 370). 
2. This brief account does not, of course, do justice to the many forces that set the New Deal 
Party System in motion. But the basic point here is consistent with some of the best work 
on partisan change (see Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale, 1980; Sundquist, 1983; and Car- 
mines and Stimson, 1989). 
3. There has been much disagreement between scholars over what constitutes a change in 
party systems or what political scientists commonly refer to as a "realignment." Some 
scholars contend that a shift in party systems occurs when there is an enduring change in 
the share of support the parties receive in elections (Key, 1955; Burnham, 1970; Clubb et 
al., 1980). An alternative conception stresses the coalitional underpinnings of the parties, 
holding that a new partisan arrangement arises when these coalitions undergo lasting 
change (Petrocik, 1981, 1987; Beck, 1982). The final perspective claims that party systems 
emerge when new issues arise that divide the nation and the parties, generating signifi- 
cant and enduring partisan change among the electorate (Sundquist, 1983; Carmines and 
Stimson, 1989). I do not comment directly on that debate, except to argue that one thing 
party systems are associated with is a set of issues that defined the political debate of the 
era. 
4. To support the argument that this definition is not "too" broad, one can look at the NES's 
coding scheme for the open-ended questions asking respondents what they like and dis- 
like about the parties and candidates. The NES provides over 500 different codes to 
represent the many statements citizens make in response to these questions. Using Kel- 
ley's definition of New Deal issues as a guide, about 20 percent of all codes in 1984 were 
labeled "New Deal." It is unclear, of course, whether this proportion is large or small, but 
at least a good many non-New Deal concerns exist. Actually, the share of New Deal 
comments seems reasonable, given that any set of issues associated with a party system 
should dominate the political debate and thus is likely to comprise a large part of it. 
5. Specifically, the NES poses the following questions to respondents: 
Is there anything in particular about (the candidate's name) that might make you want to 
vote for him? 
Is there anything in particular about (the candidate's name) that might make you want to 
vote against him? 
Is there anything in particular you like about the (Democratic or Republican) party? 
Is there anything in particular you don't like about the (Democratic or Republican) party? 
6. In 1972, the NES released only three responses to the open-ended questions. In another 
version of the data, however, all five comments were included. I want to thank Michael 
Kagay for making this latter version available to me. 
7. The definition of New Deal issues I presented above served as the guide for what com- 
ments to include and what to exclude. Appendix A presents the specific coding scheme. 
8. Eric Smith has recently marshaled an impressive critique of the like/dislike questions, 
arguing, among other things, that the responses "do not reveal fundamental attitudes" but 
instead measure "superficial" concerns (1989, pp. 84, 87). This argument raises serious 
doubts about the usefulness of these data to study partisan change. Smith's (1989) distinc- 
tion, however, between "fundamental" and "superficial" attitudes is problematic. He as- 
sumes that new information can generate only superficial attitudes. Such an assumption is 
unreasonable, since surely some recently learned information will be important to citi- 
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zens. Geer (1991) has presented some experimental evidence consistent with this point, 
suggesting that responses to open-ended questions can in fact tap salient attitudes. 
Smith (1989), however, is correct in arguing that the ebb and flow of a campaign will 
have some influence on the content of responses to open-ended questions. But this find- 
ing should not be a worry, since, as noted above, some information available in campaigns 
is likely to be salient to voters. Moreover, if an issue like abortion dominates a particular 
election, the responses of some citizens to the open-ended questions may reflect it. But if 
concerns about abortion are indeed "short-term," then one should see a decline in the 
importance of this issue for the next election. Thus, by examining a series of elections, 
one should be better able to sort out such temporary effects. But if the change persists 
over a number of elections, it would indicate a shift in the political debate and hence 
comment on the relevance of those issues to the public. 
9. One may voice concern about weighting each comment equally. It is possible, for in- 
stance, that the first comment is more important to respondents, suggesting some sort of 
weighting scheme may be in order. While such a view is quite reasonable, Kagay (1980) 
provides a statistical defense of this assumption. See also Kelley for additional justifica- 
tions of it (1983), pp. 13-15, 227-238). 
10. Note that citizens who see the issue as favoring neither party are not represented in this 
measure. Therefore, if the I)emocratic bias is 55 percent, the Republican bias is 45 per- 
cent. 
11. This concept builds on Kelley's (1983) notion of "pull" that measures whether an issue 
favors a particular party. Although that measure is usefull for interpreting elections, it does 
not tell us how the opposing party fared on that issue. To assess partisan change, we need 
to know the pull of both parties on an issue; hence the notion of net pull. 
12. This trend, of course, reflects the increase in the number of people who make no com- 
ments at all about the parties (see Sniderman, Brody, Seigel, and Tannenbaum, 1982; 
Wattenberg, 1990). One can interpret this rise in what Sniderman and colleagues call 
"indifferents" a number of ways. For the purpose of this article, I shall treat this change as 
a sign of what some have called "dealignment." 
13. An additional way to disaggregate these results is to examine shifts within each question. 
So, what does the trend look like for the public's "likes of the D)emocratic party"? or 
"dislikes of the Republican candidate"? etc. For each of the eight questions, the same 
pattern found in Table 1 appears. That is, among the four (lquestions about the two nomi- 
nees, New Deal issues have become more salient. For the items concerning the parties, 
the importance of concerns about the New 1Deal have declined. There is more instability 
in these patterns, but the results lend additional support to the evidence presented 
above. 
14. One can test crudely this notion of overlap by looking at certain responses to the open- 
ended questions. Specifically, do respondents talk about party leaders when discussing 
the parties? And do citizens mention the party when assessing the candidates? In both 
cases, the answer is yes. Using data from 1988, 36 percent of respondents made a partisan 
connection with one of the candidates (open-ended codes 500-597). At the same time, 11 
percent of the sample mentioned a party leader when discussing what they liked and 
disliked about the parties (open-ended codes 1-97). 
15. One might wonder how the salience of New Deal issues compares to other sets of con- 
cerns. To some extent, density provides a test for whether other issues have eroded the 
relative importance of New Deal issues. But still other concerns could be increasing in 
salience to the electorate. To consider this possibility, I looked at mentions about foreign 
policy and the so-called "social issue." In both cases, no such patterns arose. I also exam- 
ined whether "personality" concerns have increased among the questions about the candi- 
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dates. With the rise of "candidate-centered" campaigns, one might think that citizens 
make more comments about the personal characteristics of the candidates il the 1980s 
than the 1950s. Again, the data do not support such a hypothesis. These additional an- 
alyses lend ftirther support to the conclusions presented so far. 
16. Just as a point of comparison, a net pull of 25 percent is quite large. Consider, for exam- 
ple, for an issue that is highly salient (let us assume 85%) and that heavily favors a party 
(65% to 35%), the net pull is about 26 percent. 
17. A good deal of scholarship has focused on shifts in the coalitional underpinnings of the two 
parties. An advocate of that approach might argue that the importance and influence of 
New Deal issues may vary across different segments of the electorate. Thus, by not exam- 
ining relevant coalitional groups in the electorate, one may miss significant patterns of 
change in the salience and partisan influence of New Deal issues. 
To explore these potentially differential patterns of change, I examined how blacks, 
white southerners, members of union households, white northern Protestants, Catholics, 
and first-time voters responded to New Deal issues. In each case, New Deal issues re- 
mained salient to these different groups. There were, however, some significant changes 
in the partisan bias of these issues for a few groups. The white south, for instance, now 
views the GOP favorably on New Deal issues. Blacks, on the other hand, increased their 
support for the Democrats on New Deal issues. All in all, the data support the work of 
other scholars that there has been a restructuring of coalitions of the parties (see Petrocik, 
1981, 1987; Ladd and Hadley, 1978; Stanley, 1987; Black and Black, 1987; Axelrod, 1986; 
Stanley et al., 1986). These data are available upon request. 
18. I have not reported the attitudes of the public separately for parties and candidates. This 
decision stems, for the most part, from my earlier argument that a usefiul way to assess 
partisan change was to combine both sets of (questions. But an additional benefit of this 
decision is that the paper is kept within a manageable size. For those interested, the 
patterns are much like those found in Tables 1 and 2. These separate analyses are avail- 
able upon request. 
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